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The Constitution of Conscience

Steven L. Winter*
Nowhere more than in law do you need armor againstthat type
of ethnocentric and chronocentric snobbery-the smugness of
your own tribe and your own time .... '

I.

Constitutional Lore and the Preaching of the Parables

Imagine a society, scarcely different than our own, in which people
regularly consult specialists before making important life choices. In this
society, however, the specialists are neither lawyers nor therapists. For
this culture has developed a sophisticated store of folk wisdom-maxims,
proverbs, parables, and the like-that serves as its basic ethical and intellectual resource. In times of personal crisis, people turn for the necessary
guidance to experts in this folklore. Take, for example, a person contemplating a job assignment that would force her to leave loved ones for an
extended period. To help her choose the proper course of action, she
would consult one of these professional "counsellors." After an extended
consultation that typically would include an exhaustive case history, the
counsellor might say something like this: "I have studied your situation and
reviewed the relevant precedents. In my professional opinion, this is a
clear case of 'absence makes the heart grow fonder.' I recommend that
you accept the assignment and not worry about estrangement from your
loved ones." 2
As we might well expect, counsellors enjoy a fair degree of authority
and prestige in this society. Accordingly, the profession has a stake in

* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.A. 1974, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1977,
Columbia. For their comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Mike Fischl, Mark Johnson, Frank
Michelman, Geoff Miller, Jeremy Paul, Dick Posner, Lynn Winter, and those stalwarts who participated in a faculty seminar at the University of Miami School of Law. This one's for Elizabeth Anne.
I. KARL N. LLEwEL.LYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 44 (2d ed. 1951)
[hereinafter LLEwELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH].

2. Devoted readers of the Texas Law Review will recognize that this hypothetical is based on
Jeremy Paul, The Politics ofLegal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1815-20 (1991).
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assuring that counsellors are well versed in the relevant cultural lore and
highly trained in the methods and traditions of their craft. (We might
imagine, if we like, that practitioners are licensed by the state or certified
by some quasi-public professional board.) Predictably, there are highly
selective professional schools for the education and training of future practitioners. Many of these "schools of counselling" are affiliated with major
research universities. These university schools of counselling attract the
brightest college graduates as students and hire only the most distinguished
counsellors as faculty.
The presence of these schools in the university has helped create an
intellectual environment conducive to the systematic study and analysis of
the art of counselling. Prominent academics publish books on the theory
of counselling, treatises on various aspects of counselling lore, and scholarly articles exploring the subtleties of the maxims and proverbs that
constitute the substantive material of the discipline. With the escalating
sophistication of this scholarship, both lore and the profession gain in
intellectual prominence and social power.
Inevitably, however, some brash young scholar at one of the elite university schools makes a startling discovery: Every maxim appears to have
a counter-maxim that, in any given case, could be applied with equal
plausibility.3 He begins to question the prevailing belief system that
credits the traditional lore with the ability to resolve problems. He points
out that most counselling lore can be reduced to simple lists of opposing
proverbs. He offers the following examples:4
too many cooks spoil the broth
a stitch in time saves nine
out of sight, out of mind
he who hesitates is lost
nothing ventured, nothing gained
opportunity knocks but once

many hands make light work
cross your bridges when you come to them
absence makes the heart grow fonder
look before you leap
a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush
if at first you don't succeed, try, try again

He observes, moreover, that each column describes a distinctive modality
or style of thought. The left-hand column represents an "entrepreneurial"
approach emphasizing values of self-reliance, decisiveness, and risk taking.

3. The model, as will become obvious in a moment, is Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976). Of course, the original effort is that of
Llewellyn. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1239 (1931) ("[In any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the
available authoritative premises-i.e., premises legitimate and impeccable under the traditional legal
techniques-are at least two, and ... the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case in
hand."); see also Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About CriticalLegal Studies, 41 U. MLIA
L. REv. 505, 513-22 (1987) (discussing this version of the indeterminacy argument in law).
4. The matched pairs of proverbs come from James Boyle, The Anatomy ofa Torts Class, 34 AM.
U. L. REV. 1003, 1051-52 (1985), and Paul, supra note 2, at 1815-20.
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Conversely, the right-hand column represents a "bourgeois" outlook characterized by such virtues as cooperation, attachment, caution, and perseverance. In any given case, a counsellor can draw a maxim from one or
the other of these modalities to support either the more adventurous or the
more risk-averse course of action.
On the basis of these observations, the scholar makes three disturbing
claims. First, he contends that, in any given case, a competent counsellor
will be able to justify opposite recommendations by invoking either proverb
from a matched pair. Second, he argues that the practice of counselling is
nothing more than the skillful invocation of stylized rhetorical moves that
are then used to rationalize outcomes. Third, he concludes that counselling
lore should no longer be viewed as a set of substantive precepts, but should
instead be studied as a kind of language or semiotic system. He christens
this endeavor "counselling lore semiotics." Adherents refer to it simply
as "cls."
A ferocious debate ensues. Traditionalist practitioners, for whom the
lore is nothing less than the authoritative repository of the objective
wisdom of the culture, experience the semiotic thesis as an assault on the
foundations of their profession. Prominent traditionalists denounce cls
adherents as "nihilists." They maintain, moreover, that counsellors properly trained in their craft are in fact able reliably to resolve problems using
the traditional tools. The critics, in turn, accuse the traditionalists of
merely exploiting claims of specialized competence to advance their professional and economic self-interest. They maintain that the system of
contradictory proverbs cannot itself generate solutions and, accordingly,
that there must be "something else" that really determines outcomes. For
these critics, the maxims and proverbs are merely mystifications deployed
to channel behavior in ways that perpetuate the social and economic status
quo. In short, the critics claim that "lore is politics."
These antitheses, however, do not exhaust the debate. For this society, too, has its Wittgensteinians. One of them points out that both sides
of the controversy make the same basic error. Both assume that the legitimacy of counselling depends upon establishing adequate truth conditions
for the maxims. The traditionalists believe that this promise can, in principle, be redeemed. Because they believe that language mirrors or represents things in the world, they maintain that statements of lore-such as the
maxims-attain truth-value by virtue of their correspondence with objective
states of affairs such as the facts of the given case or the meaning of a
precedent. In contrast, the critics contend that there are no such independent, external referents, either for language or for lore. They regard
truth conditions as merely a matter of agreement or convention, and they
insist that this is no less true of lore.
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For our Wittgensteinian counsellor, however, these contending views
ask the wrong question because they subscribe to the same mistaken premise. Adherents of both views assume that counselling lore is representational-that is, that the maxims are statements about the world. Consequently, they think that the maxims stand in need of justification. But,
the Wittgensteinian explains, the maxims and other components of the culture's folk wisdom are more properly regarded as constitutional-thatis,
as constituting the way in which members of this particular society engage
in making decisions concerning important life choices. Thus, the maxims
are not statements about the world, but a means of engagement with it.
Lore "is something we do, not something we have as a consequence of
something we do. "'
On this view, the legitimacy of counselling is solely a matter of conforming to "that system of logical constraints that the practices of [counselling] activities have developed in our particular culture." 6 With legitimacy thus detached from the problem of justification, justification can be
discarded as a pointless and irrelevant question. One might just as well ask
for the foundations that "justify" the English language. Once "we understand the rules of a language-game, we understand all that there is to understand about why moves in that language-game are made." 7 Legitimacy
is simply a function of operating within those practices and conventions
that define counselling as a discipline and constitute it as a semiotic
system.'
Our Wittgensteinian is quite pleased with this intervention. By resolving the lore into its constitutive practices, he has gone a long way toward
defanging the debate. Still, he realizes that this stratagem does not resolve
the problem of indeterminacy that arises from the matched pairs of proverbs. On this point, too, he adopts a strategy of confession and avoidance.
He observes that any fully comprehensive system cannot also be determinate. 9 Accordingly, he argues that the indeterminacy of counselling lore
is more advantage than objection. First, it enables the system to encom-

5. PHILIP BOBnrr,

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1991)

[hereinafter BoBBITT,

INTERPRETATION].
6. Id.; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 236 (1982) [hereinafter BOBBrrr, FATE]

("Law consists of resolving questions in the context of the conventions that provide the methods for
answering them."). Note that Bobbitt uses "legitimacy" in the more limited sense of "internally valid"
rather than "externally justified." I shall conform to that usage throughout this Paper.
7. RIcHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 174 (1979) [hereinafter RORTY,
MIRROR OF NATURE].

8. For a description of Philip Bobbitt's work as a traditionalist version of legal semiotics, see J.M.
Balkin, The Promise ofLegal Semioics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1832 n.7 (1991); id. at 1842 n.38.
9. See BOBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 31 ("If it is determinate--does not generate

contradictory outcomes-then there will be some cases it cannot decide .... If the scbeme is comprehensive,... it will be indeterminate as to which of the conventional modalities is to be applied.").
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Second, it enables the

system to operate ethically because it insures a space for moral reflection
by the counsellor. "[T]he system is just, not because it produces just
outcomes, but because it permits an opportunity for justice consistent with

the freedom of the conscience to decide matters.""
There the debate rests. Or so it seems until some new upstart observes that the resort-to-conscience gambit only seems persuasive because
it is already a standardized-indeed, boringly familiar-move in the traditional language-game of counselling." Worse yet, the upstart points out

that this gambit only manages to resurrect the very problem that the Wittgensteinian had previously purported to resolve.

Where he had earlier

eluded the infinite regress by discarding the question of justification, the
Wittgensteinian has now recreated it in his attempt to sidestep the indeterminacy problem. In embracing the conventional rhetoric of moral
theory, he has merely relocated the problem of justification-that is, "what

makes the system just?"-from the lore to the individual conscience. 2

But what justifies the choices of the individual conscience?
Here, the Wittgensteinian makes a move that is as predictable as it is
telling. Justification comes after decision; it is always a matter of "some
external standard"1 3 constituted by the altogether separate practices of
moral evaluation. 4 The move is predictable because there is nowhere
10. Id. at 163.
11. As Pierre Schlag puts it, "how is it that we, in law, resolve difficult problems, reconcile contradictions and overcome aporias, etc.? The answer of modem American legal thought is clear and unequivocal: 'We refer them to the goodjudgment of the pragmatist.'" Pierre Schlag, Le Hors de Texte,
C'est Moi : The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDozo L. REv.
1631, 1659-60 (1990). The resort-to-conscience gambit has been a mainstsy of conventional legal
theory since the heyday of the legal realists. For examples (both hoary and trendy), see LLEELYN,
BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 1, at 150 ("Of course, from one angle, the two guides are inconsistent.
But each, for itself, is true, is sound, is vital-in its place. When to use which? ... Choice is your
own. Your answer for your choice. There are no rules to shoulder your responsibility." (emphasis
in original)); Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubeek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and
Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE LJ. 255, 263 (1961) (reviewing KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)) (criticizing Llewellyn because he "has divorced 'creativity' from the hard choice of values, and the freedom to choose among
them, which is an important part of creativity"); Margaret J.Radin, 'After the Final No There Comes
a Yes": A Law Teacher's Report, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 253, 262 (1990) ("We can embrace our
nature as creatures of the word, and our world as a world of words to the end of it, and yet not rest
content .... Sometimes-andonly situatedjudgmentcan tell us when-wemustbe suspicious ofwhat
we are hiding." (emphasis added)). See also James Donato, Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal
Interpretation,40 STAN. L. REV. 1517,1540 (1988) ("Dworkin manages to turn the idea of subjectivity
in interpretation from a simple criticism into a sophisticated form of legal hermeneutics.").
12. See BOBBrrr, INTERPRErATION, supra note 5, at 177 ("This system, as I have observed, requires individual decision precisely because the modalities conflict." (emphasis added)).
13. Id. at 163.
14. Thus, the Wittgensteinian observes:
[A) particular decision will be deemed just according to the prevailing practices of moral
theory. These may legitimately influence a... decider when faced with a modal conflict
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else-that is, no more foundational place-for a Wittgensteinian to go
except to some other, entirely distinct practice."5 And it is telling
precisely because it can tell us so little about what it means for an individual conscience to decide. If the conscience does not engage in moral theorizing, then in what language-game is it engaged when it does decide? If
that language-game is the lore itself, then what is added by the resort to
conscience? And if the conscience is engaged in some language-game
other than the lore, then what is the form of life that characterizes that
activity? What, in short, is the form of life that constitutes conscience?
This predicament is all the more mortifying because it is one of his
own making. As every Wittgensteinian knows, the only way to escape the
presuppositions of a language-game is "simply ... to change the subject."16 In not fully repudiating the question of justification, our Wittgensteinian counsellor traps himself into offering a pseudo-answer. Instead
of evading the infinite regress, he steps right into it.
Faced with such an embarrassing impasse, one is left only with silence-and the sneaking suspicion that it's still just turtles all the way
down.
II. Lore and...
Every language-game has a rhetorical economy-that is, a repertoire
of moves that, though adaptable to changes in context, remains largely
predictable. This is why, notwithstanding the transposition of well-known
debates in legal and constitutional theory to the imaginary context of folk-

but such a role is irrelevant to their role as evaluative standards oncethe decision has been
made. ....Simply because we use such "theories" to map our acts of conscience we
should not be led to conclude that they bear any causal relationship to the terrain thereof.
Id. at 168.
15. Later, I shall identify this as the "particularist fallacy." See infra text accompanyingnotes 2640. In the meantime, consider Stanley Fish's claim "that performing an activity-engaging in a
practice-is one thing and discoursing on that practice another," STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY INLITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES
377 (1989), and his explication "that judging or doing judging is one thing and giving accounts or
theories ofjudging is another, and that as practices they are independent," id. at 378. See also RORTY,
MIRROR OF NATURE, supra note 7, at 320 ("[N]ormal discourse is that which is conducted within an
agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering
a question, what counts as having a good argument for that answer or a good criticism of it.").
16. RICHARD RORTY, Introduction:PragmatismandPhilosophy, Introduction to CONSEQUENCES
OF PRAGMATISM xiv (1982) [hereinafter RORTY, Pragmatism]("This does not mean that they have a
new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we
should ask those questions anymore."); see also RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY 8 (1989) [hereinafter RORTY, CONTINGENCY] ("To say that we should drop the idea of
truth as out there... is to say that our purposes would be served best by ceasing to see truth as a deep
matter ... or 'true' . . . a term which repays 'analysis.'... But this claim about relative profitability, in turn, is just the recommendation that we in fact say little about [the] topics, and see how we
get on.").
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lore counselling, the opening allegory unfolds in such a distressingly
familiar progression.
My purpose in resituating these debates as I have is to problematize
an entire sequence of conventional jurisprudential arguments. By relocating these arguments in an unfamiliar setting, I hope to deprive them
of the taken-for-granted quality or plausibility that normally accrues from
encountering them on their familiar intellectual terrain. Moreover, by recasting these debates in the particular context of our own folklore, I hope
to expose something very odd-if not, in fact, quite fantastic-about the
common underlying assumption of these otherwise disparate jurisprudential
positions. Just as we might probe a doctrine by spinning hypotheticals, we
can test the cogency of accepted arguments in contemporary legal theory
by seeing how well they fare when called upon to account for other social
phenomena.
But does the change of setting really problematize these arguments?
At first blush, it seems quite plausible to apply the indeterminacy critique
to the fanciful field of folklore counselling. We are accustomed to thinking
of cliches such as "absence makes the heart grow fonder" and "out of
sight, out of mind" as mere platitudes. It is therefore easy to accept the
claim that, as bromides without substance, these maxims are susceptible to
instrumental manipulation by self-appointed "experts."
But, as Jeremy Paul has argued in these pages, it is a mistake to think
that these maxims are "as empty as mindless clich6s." 1 Banal though
they be, such proverbs as "absence makes the heart grow fonder" are part
of the common stock of folk wisdom that we accumulate as we come to
maturity in this culture."8 Virtually every one of us has had an experience
in which we have either applied or been advised to heed one of these
maxims. Most of us have survived separations in which absence did make
the heart grow fonder; so, too, we have been a part of weak relationships
in which "out of sight" really was "out of mind." At times, we may even
have used these maxims as a means of making up our minds about a relationship. Thus, the contrast between these two emotional responses is one
way in which we take a sounding of our feelings when we are uncertain.
As a consequence of these experiences, the maxims serve for us "as evocative capsules to trigger memories of how [we have] coped with similar
decisions and experiences in the past."19

17. Paul, supra note 2, at 1816. In a related view, Geoff Miller argues that the maxims of statutory construction-which are also perceived as empty and contradictory-can be understood as corollaries of Grice's principles of implication. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of
Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1179.
18. As we will see below, the ordinary, basic-level quality of these proverbs is an integral part
of the process of cultural transmission. See infra text accompanying notes 63-67 and 77-79.
19. Paul, supra note 2, at 1817; cf. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN
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It follows that, in an important sense, the indeterminacy of the maxims
is manufactured. It is achieved by ignoring all of the history, context, and
social experience that make them meaningful. Stripped of significance in
this way-like the gestures of a person in a phone booth seen from far
away-anything is likely to seem senseless and absurd.' Little wonder
that the proverbs appear vulnerable to manipulation.
Similarly, the claim that for every case there is a mutually contradictory pair of equally applicable proverbs depends upon a deliberate flattening of the maxims. Take the example of the paired maxims "absence
makes the heart grow fonder" and "out of sight, out of mind. ' The supposed opposition between them is a function of superficial readings that
reduce these proverbs to their propositional content. On this rendition,
both "absent" and "out of sight" are straightforwardly reducible to "not
present"; "fondness" is just a matter of having affectionate thoughts and,
thus, the opposite of "out of mind."
But these simplistic paraphrases ignore the metaphoric content of the
maxims that contributes much of their sense.21 We know that absence
only makes the heartgrow fonder; relationships that are unimportant emotionally are all too easily forgotten and casually discarded. We know this
because, in our culture, the heart is the metaphoric seat of the emotions
and the mind is the province of detached observation-the "mirror" of reality-and the realm of "cool reason. "I Thus, the disparate metaphors signal that the two proverbs identify different phenomenological domains with
different psychological dynamics: In the domain of the heart, "absence"
signifies the kind of emotional lack or deficiency that so often stimulates
an increase in sentimental attachment. In the domain of the mind, "out of
sight" indicates not just lack of presence, but irrelevance or insignificance
to one's everyday reality. One need only transpose the metaphors-as in,
"out of sight makes the heart grow fonder"-to see how awkward and absurd the maxim becomes.

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 295 (1922) ("Since morals is [sic] concerned with conduct,
it grows out of specific empirical facts.").
"20. Both the image and the substantive point are from Merlcau-Ponty. MAURIC
MERLEAUPONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENsE 39 (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Patricia A. Dreyfus trans., 1964).
21. For an extended discussion of the role of metaphors in structuring proverbs, see GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 160-

216 (1989). See also infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
22. Thus, Jeremy Paul is right to focus on the metaphors at work in this proverb. See Paul, supra
note 2, at 1816 n.108 (noting that "the heart, symbolizing a person's decpest emotions, gains appreciation for an absent love," and that, in contrast, "the mind, which sometimes 'changes' or 'plays
tricks,' too easily forgets the absent friend"). In the case of this particular proverb, the connotation
that "true" love will survive separation may be overdeterminedbecausethe metaphor of heart also signifies sincerity-"I mean it with all my heart"-and fortitude-"he has a lot of heart."
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Indeed, one can test the claimed opposition between any pair of proverbs by identifying the operative metaphor and transposing it to its supposed antonym. Thus, "many hands make light broth," "he who hesitates
before he leaps is lost," and "no birds ventured, no birds gained" are all
a bit bizarre at best. In each case, the absurdity arises from what we know
about the underlying experience that provides the source domain for the
maxim's operative metaphor. 3 Broth-making is a delicate task that requires subtlety and precision, as opposed to the "heavy" work that benefits
from many hands. Leaping can be dangerous if the height is too great; this
is why looking is such a good idea.' A bird's ability to take flight can
make it an elusive quarry; the moral is that, when circumstances are chancy, it may be better to rest content with what one has already attained than
to pursue what may prove to be unrealizable.'
The basic point is that trite cliches like "absence makes the heart
grow fonder" are neither bearers of intrinsic, objective meanings nor mere
floating signifiers. They are, rather, the way in which we understand and
communicate an entire infrastructure of experience and social knowledge.
It is this (largely social) experience that constitutes meaning and makes it
possible. One can always ignore these grounding experiences, strip language of its meaning, and make things seem contradictory or indeterminate. But in doing so, one indulges-even if unwittingly-in the kind of
naive linguistic reification which supposes that words do stand apart from
the practices and understandings of those who speak them.
Although the Wittgensteinian understanding avoids this obvious linguistic naivet6, it introduces its own, equally serious problems. I will refer
to these as the "particularist fallacy" and "practice fetishism," respectively.
Both stem from Wittgenstein's claim that all language and thought are embedded in action.' Ultimately, however, each of these difficulties turns
out to be the product of a reduction surprisingly comparable to-indeed,
the mirror-image of-that which yields the naive linguistic reification.

23. To be clear, I am employing a theory of metaphor understood as a matter of semantic content
rather than mere expression, a matter of thought rather than mere language. Thus, "metaphor" refers
to a tightly structured set of conceptual mappings in which a target domain is understood in terms of
a source domain of more readily comprehended, embodied or social experience. See George Lakoff,
The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 202, 206-09 (Andrew Ortony
ed., 2d ed. 1992).
24. Though "he who hesitates before he leaps is lost" might still be good advice to the last paratrooper in the squad.
25. Though "no birds ventured, no birds gained" could apply to some exotic wager.
26. As he explains, "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 23 (G.E.M. Anscombetrans., 2d ed. 1958) (emphasis in original);
cf.Thomas C. Grey, Holmes andLegal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 798 (1989) ("[T]he dis-

tinctive feature of recent reinterpretations of pragmatism is... the idea that thought is essentially embedded in a context of social practice.").
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The fundamental Wittgensteinian move might be characterized as a
naturalized behaviorism: Language is seen not as a matter of representation

"in which we try to form pictures of reality, but as part of the behavior of
human beings. On this view, the activity of uttering sentences is one of the
things people do in order to cope with their environment."I For the

Wittgensteinian, meaning does not derivefrom something (like a practice);
rather, meaning inheres in practice.28 As Stanley Fish explains, understanding is a matter of "tacit knowledge that tells [one] not so much what

to do, but already has [one] doing it as a condition of perception and even
of thought."29 Fish illustrates this point with an anecdote in which a New
York imes reporter asked the pitcher Dennis Martinez what advice his
manager, Earl Weaver, had offered before the game. Martinez replied:
"He [Weaver] said, 'Throw strikes and keep 'em off the bases,' . .. and
I said 'O.K.,' . ..
.
What else could I say? What else could he say?"'
Although it is actually quite different, the Wittgensteinian view is

frequently mistaken for conventionalism. One can see how this misunderstanding occurs. In resolving a line of thought into its constitutive practices, it is easy to think of those practices as a set of rules or conventions
that are followed or obeyed by self-directing practitioners.31 Thus, when

our Wittgensteinian counsellor argued that legitimacy is a function of operating within the practices and conventions of the counselling profession,32 one might have read this reductively as a claim that legitimacy is
a matter of conforming with the agreed-upon professional conventions. But
this is precisely the mistake that Wittgenstein warned against.33 To op27. RoRTY, Pragmatism,supra note 16, at xvii; see also RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 16,
at 15 ("This Wittgensteinian attitude... naturalizes mind and language by making all questions about
the relation of either to the rest of [the] universe causal questions, as opposed to questions about adequacy of representation or expression." (emphasis in original)).
28. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 24 ("Law is something we do, not something

we have as a consequence of something we do."); see also Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of
Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 55 (1993)
[hereinafter Patterson, Interpretive Universalism] ("Catching on to and participating in these activitiesknowing how to act-is the essence of understanding." (emphasis in original)).
29. FISH, supra note 15, at 127.
30. Id. at 372.
31. For example, consider Steve Burton's very analytic take on the elements that comprise a
language-game: "Different intellectual discourses, or 'language-games,' can be distinguished in five respects: They proceed from different standpoints, in different vocabularies, with reference to different
entities, guided by different ground rules, and under different criteria for success." STEVEN J.
BURTON, JUDGING INGOOD FAITH 117 (1992) (emphasis added).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
33. As Wittgenstein puts it, "'[s]o
are you saying that human agreement decides what is true and
what is false?'-lt is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the languagethey
use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 26, § 241
(emphasis in original). Perhaps because the master himself warned against this misunderstanding, it
is the one that his devotees most like to attribute to one another when they are engaged in the languagegame of academic one-upmanship. Thus, in a truly egregious misreading, Dennis Patterson argues that
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erate "within" the conventions of a practice is not a matter of following or
complying with its rules; it is, rather, to take part in those activities that
constitute the practice as a practice.'
This emphasis on practice as an ongoing activity is a salutary corrective to the reductive and reified view of practice as merely a matter of
following conventions. Still, it has its own characteristic costs. The

Wittgensteinian, it will be recalled, abjures the common representational
view in favor of an essentiallyperfornativeview of meaning-that is, that

the meaning of a word is a matter of how it is used.35 Consider the example of a traffic sign that says, "No Right Turn on Red" posted at that
point of a "T" shaped intersection where no right turn is possible.' The

sign is absurd, but not because it fails accurately to represent a state of
affairs in the world. Indeed, in some "literalist" sense the sign is correct:
There is no turning there when the light is red, or at any other time.
Rather, the sign is unintelligible because it has no meaning as part of the

activity of driving; it is pointless because it has no social consequences.
Too narrow a focus on the performative dimension of meaning, however, can lead to the kind of parochialism that I identified earlier as the

"particularist fallacy." A practice, after all, is an activity directed at some
pragmatic end. Folklore counselling, to return to the opening allegory, is
about resolving personal crises and making important life choices. The
proverbs are the tools or instruments of this activity. It follows, or so the
argument goes, that one cannot understand the maxims except as elements
of this particular practice. It is but a short step to the conclusion that every

Stanley Fish is a conventionalist who thinks that all understandingis merely a matter of interpretation.
See Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 283-84 (1993)
[hereinafter Patterson, Conscienceand Constitution] ("Fish is the arch-conventionalist; he is unwilling
to consider the possibility that meaning could arise other than by tacit or explicit interpretive assumption."); Patterson, Interpretive Universalism, supra note 28, at 40 ("For Fish, it is not enough to
say that a word has meaning by virtue of the ways in which it is used (action); Fish's claim is much
stronger than that ....
The meanings of our words rest on 'tacit assumptions' that give the signs the
meaning they have."). The magnitude of this misreading is striking when one considers Fish's celebratory use of the Dennis Martinez anecdote. See FISH, supra note 15, at 372, 372-74 (characterizing
Martinez's "deadpan rebuke" as having "a precision that Wittgenstein might envy"). For his own response, see Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72
TEX. L. REv. 57, 65 (1993) ("Patterson wants to be like Ludwig, or to be Ludwig's best explicator
or the enforcer of Ludwig's insights. I'm not saying it's a bad game[, but] . . as the immortal Sam
Goldwyn once put it, 'Include me out.'"). For an extended analysis of how and why Patterson keeps
repeating this mistake, see Steven L. Winter, One Size FitsAll, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1857 (1994).
34. See FISH, supra note 15, at 386-87 ("To think within a practice is to have one's very perception and sense of possible and appropriate action issue 'naturally'-without further reflection-from
one's position as a deeply situated agent." (emphasis in original)).
35. See WITTGTENMN, supra note 26, § 43 ("For a large class of cases-though not for all-in
which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the
language." (emphasis in original)).
36. It may seem like I'm making this up, but I'm not-at least, not quite. See Steven L. Winter,
Contingency and Community in Normative Practice. 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963. 963-64 (1991).
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practice obtains its defining character from the objectives, methods, values,
and underlying rationales that constitute that particular endeavor as an
endeavor.17 In this' sense, all practices are "local" practices.
The "particularist fallacy," then, is the assumption that every practice
or discourse is a matter of understandings and conventions specific to that
activity-for example, that judging is judging and folklore counselling is
folklore counselling and never the twain shall meet. One lesson of the
opening allegory, however, is that putatively unrelated practices can be
entirely similar in shape notwithstanding radical differences in content.
This congruence, I hasten to add, is not just something built into the allegory: For one thing, the allegory had to be believable on its own terms
or it would not have succeeded as an allegory; for another, much the same
congruity can be seen whether the subjects of comparison are law and music, 38 law and poetry,3 9 or Euripides's Medea and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.4
The second distortion is what I referred to earlier as "practice fetishism." The allusion here is not to the psycho-neurotic phenomenon of obsession and arousal, but to the primitive belief system in which an article
is regarded as having or being the embodiment of a magical potency.
Thus, practice fetishism is the tendency to regard a practice as an irreducible, elemental quality that is the virtual embodiment of the understanding that it makes possible.
To appreciate the problem, it will help to reconsider why a practice
cannot be reified and treated as merely a set of rules or conventions. A
practice is a dynamic pattern of performance under varying circumstances.
Consequently, it cannot be reduced to a set of rules because no such set
could be both explicit enough to give adequate guidance and comprehensive

37. See BOBBIT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 185 (noting that "the validity of all such
answers depends on the particular discipline within which the question makes sense"); FISH, supra note
15, at 125 (observing that practice is "at every moment... ordered by an understanding of what it
is practice of (the law, basketball)" (emphasis in original)); RORTY, MIRROR OF NATURE, supra note
7, at 320 (describing "normal discourse" as "the practice of solving problems against the background
of a consensus about what counts as a good explanation of the phenomena and aboutwhat it would take
for a problem to be solved").
38. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other PerformingArts, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1597, 1654-58 (1991) (demonstrating the remarkable parallels with respect to debates over interpretation in music and law).
39. See Steven L. Winter, Death Is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 748 (1992)
[hereinafter Winter, Mother of Metaphor] (reviewing THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS
CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991)) ("[Dlespite even obvious differences in their appearance, law and poetry are surprisingly comparable products of a common human cognition.").
40. See Steven L. Winter, Foreword:On BuildingHouses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616-18 (1991)
(showing that, in rebuking the husband who abandoned her, Medea employs ostensibly "modem" legal
arguments premised on doctrines such as performance as consideration, quantum meruit, detrimental
reliance, and rescission for impossibility of performance).
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enough to cover all the possible permutations of events.41 To be able to

participate in a practice is not a matter of having knowledge of, but a
matter of situated, tacit knowledge how. As Stanley Fish explains:
To be a judge or a basketball player is not to be able to consult the
rules (or, alternatively, to be able to disregard them) but to have become an extension of the know-how that gives the rules (if there happen to be any) the meaning they will immediately and obviously
have. 42

On this view, there is little or nothing one can say about the content
or structure of a practice, except perhaps to describe the step-by-step
process of rote initiation.4 3

Practice thus becomes fetishized in two

senses. First, it is treated as a kind of conceptual primitive; a practice is
seen simply to embody the knowledge that it enables. In the revealing
words of one self-professed Wittgensteinian, "understanding is primordial."'
Second, practice is fetishized in the sense that it tends

increasingly to be represented as an autonomous, active agency. Stanley
Fish, for example, argues that an initiate "is not only possessed of but
possessed by a knowledge of the ropes" and, therefore, "is not free to
choose or originate his own meanings because a set of meanings has, in a
sense, already chosen him. " '
In an important sense, this fixation on practice should be understood

as a needed corrective to-though a decided overcompensation for-the tendency to reify practice and treat it as merely a matter of following conventions. 4 Still, to conceive of a practice as an irreducible quality-let
alone, as an animate being-is to go to the opposite extreme. This is more

41. Cf.FISH, supra note 15, at 123-25 ("Practices are not fixed and finite
.... The moral of
the story, then, is... that what you learn cannot finally be reduced to a set of rules. Or .... insofar
as the requisite knowledge can be reduced to a set of rules ('Take only good shots,' 'Consult history'),
it will be to rules whose very intelligibility depends on the practices they supposedly govern."
(emphasis in original)).
42. Id. at 128.
43. See WrTTGrrSTEIN,supra note 26, § 208 ("[11f a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall
teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice.-And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself." (emphasis in original)); see also RORTY, MIRROR OF
NATURE, supra note 7, at 174 ("[WIf we understand the rules of a language-game, we understand all
that there is ... save for the extra understanding obtained from inquiries nobody would call epistemological-into, for example, the history of the language, the structure of the brain, the evolution of the
species, and the political or cultural ambiance of the players.").
44. Patterson, Interpretive Universalism, supra note28, at 55.
45. FISH, supra note 15, at 127-28 (emphasis in original).
46. Thus, to be completely fair, Fish's "in a sense" signals that the active voice is not intended
"literally" and that its use should be understood as a strategic bit of rhetoric intended to overcome the
more conventional picture of a practice in terms of rule-following by self-directing agents. Nor does
Fish eliminate entirely the agency of the initiate or other participant; the sentence continues with the
observation that a practice "is working itself out in the actions of perception, interpretation, judgment,
etc., [the initiate] is even now performing." Id. at 128.

1818

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 72:1805

than a pedantic criticism, for this fetishization obscures some of the indispensable processes that make it possible for a practice to maintain its
continuity as a practice.47 First, it eclipses the process of objectification
and reproduction of experience that makes possible the institutionalization
of social meaning. Second, and concomitantly, it effaces the role of reflection by situated practitioners in the performance and perpetuation of a
practice.
Both of these points can be illuminated by contrasting the Wittgensteinian view with Berger and Luckmann's account of institutionalization. 41 In some respects, their account seems very much like the Wittgensteinian understanding of social meaning. Berger and Lucknmann stress the
ineradicably performative nature of social institutions: An institution exists
only to the extent that the actors who compose it successfully reproduce the
roles, routines, and patterns of behavior that constitute it as an institution.49 Similarly, they emphasize the practical and situated nature of
most knowledge-what they refer to as "recipe knowledge, that is, knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performances."' Accordingly, Berger and Luckmann stress the nontheoretical, prosaic, and
everyday quality of social knowledge and the degree to which "theory" is
something that comes afterward-and, even then, only with "heroic"

47. Similarly, Stephen Turner argues that "practices cannot be both causal and shared." STEPHEN
TURNER, THE SOCIAL THEORY OF PRACTICES: TRADITION, TACIT KNOWLEDGE, AND PRESUPPOSITION
123 (1994). Although there are similarities between Turner's argument and mine, our arguments are
fundamentally at odds in two crucial respects. Turner, too, points out the anthropomorphism in Stanley
Fish's notion of an interpretive community. Id. at 54-55. And as in the account that follows, he maintains that "[m]uch of the work done by 'shared practices'... can be done by habit." Id. at 13. But,
following Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, id. at 68-77, and Donald Davidson's account
of language, id. at 135 n.8, Turner produces an account of habituation that is genuinely individualistic.
See, e.g., id. at 98-99 ("The same kind of persistence can occur entirely through individual (and possibly literally different) habits that arise in the individual as a consequence of the emulativeperformance
of particular activities, observances and the like."). Turner is led to this position, in my view, because
he lacks a sophisticated understanding of cognition as both socially contingent and irreducibly
imaginative. See generally Steven L. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, MetaphoricReasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1122-36 (1989) [hereinafter Winter,
TranscendentalNonsense]; see also Winter, supra note 36, at 987-95.
48. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A
TREATISE INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 47-92 (2d ed. 1967).
49. As Berger and Luckmann explain, "The institution, with its assemblage of 'programmed'
actions, is like the unwritten libretto of a drama. The realization of the drama depends upon the reiterated performance of its prescribed roles by living actors ....
Neither drama nor institution exist
empirically apart from this recurrent realization." Id. at 75; see also id. at 52 ("[Slocial order exists
only and insofar as human activity continues to reproduce it.").
50. Id. at 42. As they elaborate, "a large part of the social stock of knowledge consists of recipes
for the mastery of routine problems. Typically, I have little interest in going beyond this pragmatically
necessary knowledge as long as the problems can indeed be mastered thereby." Id. at 43. Along
similar lines, they recognize the "local" nature of institutional practices. See id. at 65 ("On the pretheoretical level,. . . every institution has a body of transmitted recipe knowledge, that is, knowledge
that supplies the institutionally appropriate rules of conduct.").

1994]

The Constitution of Conscience

1819

effort."1 Finally, they emphasize that this practical knowledge is learned
through a process of instruction, initiation, and internalization such that
social knowledge becomes constitutive of the individual.52
Unlike the Wittgensteinian, however, Berger and Luckmann recognize
that a certain amount of reification is integral to the process of institu-

tionalization. 53 They use habitualization as a model' with which to ex-

plain this process: "Any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast
into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and
which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern." 55
Consequently, the phenomenological experience of habituation has a
"There I go again" feel to it. 56 Social institutions are constituted by the
buildup of reciprocal or complementary habitualizations.Y "'There he

goes again' becomes 'There we go again.'""
At this hypothetical stage, however, reification is only "incipient. " 9
Although some measure of objectification has already occurred, it "remains

tenuous, easily changeable, almost playful" because it is still "fairly
accessible to deliberate intervention" by the relevant actors.' As Berger
and Luckmann observe, however:
All this changes in the process of transmission to the new generation.
The objectivity of the institutional world "thickens" and "hardens,"
not only for the children, but (by a mirror effect) for the parents as
well. The "There we go again" now becomes "This is how these

51. See id. at 65 ("[Tlheoretical knowledge is only a small and by no means the most important
part of what passes for knowledge in a society ....
The primary knowledge about the institutional
order is knowledge on the pretheoretical level.").
52. See id. at 67 ("[What is] learned as objective truth . .. and thus internalized as subjective
reality . .. has power to shape the individual. It will produce a specific type of person... whose
identity and biography... have meaning only in a universe constituted by [that] body of knowledge.").
53. Cover makes much the same point with respect to law: "Objectification is crucial to the language games that can be played with the law and to the meanings that can be created out of it....
Creation of legal meaning entails, then, subjective commitment to an objectified understanding of a
demand." Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 45 (1983); see also Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 47, at 1208
("Cover makes a distinctly linguistic assertion about the indispensability of this process of metaphoric
reasoning to the creation of LAW ....
No law exists without reification." (emphasis in original)).
54. It is clear, however, that this is only a model and not a claim of methodological individualism.
See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 48, at 54 ("[E]ven the solitary individual... will habitualize
his activity in accordance with biographical experience of a world of social institutions preceding his
solitude ....
Empirically, the more important part of the habitualization of human activity is coextensive with the latter's institutionalization.").
55. Id. at 53 (emphasis in original).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 54 ("Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.").
58. Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 58.
60. Id.
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Institutions "have now been crystallized" and "are experienced as existing
over and beyond the individuals who 'happen to' embody them."'

An important part of this process of institutionalization involves the
phenomenon of "sedimentation" which, among other things, includes ob-

jectification in language.' Intersubjective meaning becomes "truly social
only when it has been objectivated in a sign system of one kind or another,
that is, when the possibility of reiterated objectification of the shared
experiences arises."'

Consider," for example, the development and per-

petuation of an institution. If it is to endure, it must be reproduced
successfully in the performance of actual actors. To assure such continuity, there must be an educational process through which the relevant
recipe knowledge can be transmitted systematically to those whose actions

will constitute the institution in the future. Thus, the process of transmission itself creates pressure to reduce this recipe knowledge to canonical,
easily memorizable forms0-"maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths, and so forth," the familiar "'what every-

body knows' about a social world."'

In this way, "[lI]anguage becomes

the depository of a large aggregate of collective sedimentations, which can
be acquired ... as cohesive wholes and without reconstructing their
original process of formation."67

61. Id. at 59.
62. Id. at 58.
63. See id. at 67 ("The experiences that are so retained [in consciousness] become sedimented,
that is, they congeal in recollection as recognizable and memorable entities."); see also id. at 37 (noting
that the "common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification").
For further discussion of the concept of sedimentation, its cognitive underpinnings, and its jurisprudential implications, see Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian
Difflculty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881, 1883-88 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, An UpsideDown View], and
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and lncommensurabiity in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1441, 1487-91 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability].
64. BERER & LUCKMIN, supra note 48, at 67.
65. As Berger and Luckmann explain:
[Slince human beings are frequently stupid, institutional meanings tend to become simplified in the process of transmission, so that the given collection of institutional
"formulae" can be readily learned and memorized by successive generations .... We
have here on the level of sedimented meanings the same processes of routinization and trivialization that we have already noted in the discussion of institutionalization.
Id. at 70. For a different and more charitable explanation of why proverbs take the form they dothough one also rooted in the idea of memorability-see infra note 79.
66. BERaER & LucIctANN, supra note 48, at 64.
67. Id. at 69; see also id. at 41 ("Within the semantic fields thus built up it is possible for both
biographical and historical experience to be objectified, retained, and accumulated .... By virtue of
this accumulation a social stock of knowledge is constituted, which is transmitted from generation to
generation and which is available to the individual in everyday life."). On the gestalt nature of cognitive processes, see Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 47, at 1152, 1151-56 ("[Ain
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To summarize, Berger and Luckmann see the social world as constituted by an ongoing, three-way dialectic in which externalization-that is,

ongoing human activityl-objectiflcation, and internalization are each
necessary moments.' Though they insist that this "objectivity" is socially
constructed and, therefore, has no independent ontological status,7' they
emphasize that it is nevertheless real as a phenomenological matter and es-

sential to the construction of a social world.71 Accordingly, they maintain
that any "analysis of the social world that leaves out any one of these three
moments will be distortive."7
We are now in a position to see exactly why the Wittgensteinian approach is prone to the problems and distortions identified earlier. In effect,

it goes straight from externalization-that is, ongoing human activity-to
internalization without any mediations whatsoever. Thus, even in the
hands of its most subtle proponents, the Wittgensteinian account is
necessarily impoverished by its elimination of the middle term of the
dialectic. Without a moment of objectification or other cognitive consoli-

dation, it has no alternative except to reduce meaning to a "primordial"
and inexplicable dimension of practice. Correlatively, we can also see
why, for the Wittgensteinian, reflection necessarily drops out. Simply put,
the Wittgensteinian account has nothing-that is, no "thing"-for practitioners to reflect upon. There is only the purely performative dance of an
ongoing practice and its practitioners' inexpressible tacit knowledge: "What
they know is either inside of them or (at least on this day) beyond
them."'

idealized cognitive model ('ICM') ... is a 'folk' theory or cultural model that we create and use to
organize our knowledge. It relates many concepts that are inferentially connected by means of a single
conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole." (footnoteomitted)). See also Winter,
Indeterminacy andIncommensurability,supra note 63, at 1487-88 (identifying phenomenology's concept of sedimentation with cognitive theory's construct of an ICM).
68. See, e.g., BEgRzEHR & LUCKMANN, supra note 48, at 52 ("Social order is a human product, or,
more precisely, an ongoing human production. It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing externalization.").
69. Id. at 61. Following Hegel and Marx, they use the term "objectivation." See id. at 60 ("The
process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of objectivity is objectivation." (footnote omitted)).
70. See id. ("The institutional world is objectivated human activity.... In other words, despite
the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it.").
71. See id. ("[Each of these three dialectical moments in social reality] corresponds to an essential
characterization of the social world. Society is a humanproduct. Society is an objective reality. Man
is a socialproduct." (emphasis in original)).
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. FISH, supra note 15, at 373. The extended argument for the possibility and importance of reflection by situated practitioners, what I call "situated self-consciousness," requires a full-fledged account of the role of imagination. For such an argument, see Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the
Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 664, 686 (1990). I touch on this account below. See infra
text accompanying notes 76-79.
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In its own way, then, the Wittgensteinian account turns out to be surprisingly reductive. Where the naive linguistic reification supposes that
words stand apart from the practices and understandings of those who
speak them, the Wittgensteinian approach goes to the opposite extreme.
Objectification-linguistic or otherwise-and reflection are vaporized as
everything is reduced to "practice." Ironically, this reduction revolves on
the same mistaken premise that the Wittgensteinian attributed to everyone
else: the assumption that representation could only be a matter of a one-toone correspondence with objective states of affairs in the world. Like the
conventionalist, the Wittgensteinian does not believe that such correspondence is possible. But the Wittgensteinian goes one step further and gives
up on representation altogether.74
This view ignores two things, however. The first is the ordinary capacity of humans to use language to encapsulate, communicate, and conserve shared social experience. As our examination of the folklore maxims
reveals, there is a sense in which the maxims and proverbs do have a
"representational" character. They are not merely the way in which members of this society engage in making decisions concerning important life
choices-though that they certainly are. Simple though they be, the
maxims are objectified nuggets of social wisdom that re-present the social
knowledge acquired in historical or biographical experience. And that
knowledge, in turn, shapes subsequent perception and behavior. We saw
this earlier with respect to a maxim such as "absence makes the heart grow
fonder," which serves both to evoke memories of how one has managed
emotional deprivations in the past and to provide a means of assessing
one's feelings about an ambivalent relationship in the present.7 Thus, in
an important sense, the Wittgensteinian has it wrong: Folklore is both
something we do and something we have as a consequence of something
we do.
The second, closely related thing this view ignores is the ineradicably
imaginative nature of human rationality. Thus, to say that folklore is some
"thing" we "have" is not to say either that it is an object or that it is an
objective reality. That would be the fallacy of reification-that is, to
conflate metaphor with reality and, as a consequence, to treat abstract ideas
as if they were concrete and real. 76 By the same token, the proverbs are
not point-for-point representations of objective states of affairs in the
world. Our hypothetical Wittgensteinian counsellor is correct in saying
that the maxims do not acquire legitimacy by correspondence with some
74. Thus, following Rorty, Bobbitt identifies his position as neither realist nor anti-realist but
"anti-representationalist." BOBBrrr, INTERPETATION, supra note 5, at xX (citing I RICHARD RORTY,
OB EcriVTY, RELATVSM AND TRUTH: PmLosoPmCAL PAPERS 3-4 (1991)).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
76. Winter, Mother of Metaphor, supra note 39, at 759, 766-69.
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truth-conferring, mind-independent reality. The proverbs are, after all,
social constructions. (Which is to say both that they are social constructions and that they are social constructions.') They do not derive from
experience in any direct or linear way, but are mediated by metaphor and
other imaginative processes.
To put the point in a somewhat different way, one can recharacterize
Berger and Luckmann's three-way dialectic of externalization, objectification, and internalization as a reflexive relation between experience,
imagination, and meaning. The proverbs provide a particularly good illustration. Our earlier examination showed that the folklore maxims do not
obtain their meaning solely or even primarily from their use in the practice

of counselling.

For the most part, they draw on the information-rich

imagery of concrete, everyday experiences from which we abstract general
lessons about life." For example, the maxim "a stitch in time saves

nine" maps our concrete knowledge about fabric-that, once torn, it will
progressively unravel unless mended-to an indeterminate number of other
specific situations. From one set of concrete experiences we extract the
general lesson that a small, but potentially worsening problem should be
dealt with before it turns into a major crisis. 9
The importance and ubiquity of imaginative processes such as metaphor undermine the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no more to mean-

77. The operative metaphors here are IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. See
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 46-48, 52-53 (1980).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25. As we saw, some proverbs such as "absence makes
the heart grow fonder" draw on general cultural metaphors and other forms of folk knowledge. See
supra text accompanying note 22.
79. This is a complex, imaginative process involving the conceptual metaphor GENERIC iS
sPECIFIC, which "maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel
specific-level schemas that all have the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema."
LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 21, at 162. Consider the Asian proverb, "Blind/blames the ditch."
We readily understand it as a statement about a broader class of people who have some incapacity but
who nevertheless attribute their misfortunes to external circumstances rather than to their own shortcomings. Id. As Lakoffand Turner explain, "[t]his extracted generic-level information constitutes a
generic-level schema, which can be instantiated by many other specific-level schemas." Id. at 163-64.
They continue with the following:
Generic-level schemas have the power of generality, that is, the power to make
sense of a wide range of cases. But they lack the power of specificity. Specific-level
schemas are both concrete and informsion-rich: they have rich imagery associated with
them, they are memorable, they are connected to our everyday experiences, and they
contain a relatively large amount of informstion about those concrete everyday experiences. Proverbs use both kinds of power: they lead us to general characterizations,
which nevertheless are grounded in the richness of the special case.
Such specific-level schemas tend to be evoked by short, common words, like
"blind," "blame," and "ditch." As a result short proverbs tend to be packed with information and imagery. Consequently, the knowledge they call up includes a great deal of
generic-level information as well as specific-level information.
Id. at 165.
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ing than its performative significance within a social practice. This strong
claim for practice-and the fetishism that it entails-cannot survive the
recognition that meaning is mediated by imaginative operations that include
objectification, transfiguration, and subsequent reflection. So too, the
particularism characteristic of the Wittgensteinian understanding of a
practice becomes untenable once we appreciate that we regularly use knowledge from one experiential domain to structure our understanding of
another. Consequently, many of the constituent facets of a practice will
themselves be comprehensible only by reference to things and experiences
outside that practice.
Indeed, this last point betrays a quite remarkable congruity between
the semiotic claim and the Wittgensteinian understanding. On one axis, of
course, the two views are polar opposites. One sees meaning as indeterminate and, therefore, subject to manipulation by a self-interested-or, at
least, co-opted-professional caste. The other claims that meaning inheres
in practices that cannot be transcended by agents who are themselves constituted by those practices. Oddly enough, these contending visions of
interpretive autonomy and inherence nevertheless converge on one surprising point: the practical and conceptual independence of a specialized
discipline such as law (or folklore counselling). But this shared assumption
of professional independence is quite fantastic once one appreciates the
many ways, though complex and nonlinear, in which meaning is dependent
on social experience.
III. Legal Ethnocentrism
If these comments seem abstruse, we can powerfully concentrate the
focus by inquiring into Bobbitt's ambivalent relation to Llewellyn's underrecognized classic, The Constitution as an Institution.' The evidence is
as revealing as it is terse. Bobbitt makes just two teferences to the
Llewellyn piece-one laudatory, the other critical. In Constitutional
Interpretation,Bobbitt draws a quite favorable comparison between Fish's
argument that debates over the meaning of the Constitution are the product
of different modalities of reading-that" is, constituting-the text and
Llewellyn's earlier, "brilliant" analysis of the relations between
constitutional practice and constitutional text."l In ConstitutionalFate,

80. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution,
34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Constitutionas Institution].
81. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 39. Interestingly, Bobbitt refers to Llewellyn's

article as "The Constitution as Construction/Creation." Id. at 203 n.18. That this is a parapraxis, and
not a mere mistake, is clear when one considers that Bobbitt's reformulation of the title recapitulates
the fundamental theoretical difference between him and Llewellyn: Bobbitt approaches constitutional
law as a matter of lawyers' argumentative pracdces; Llewellyn, in coritrast, sees it as an institution.
See infra text accompanying notes 85-94.
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however, Bobbitt chides Llewellyn for failing to "see the operation of the

conventions there were, because he was captivated by the old pictures [of
textualism] to whose discrediting he was devoted."'
It is not difficult to understand this conflicted reaction once one
realizes that, from Bobbitt's perspective, Llewellyn's thesis cuts uncomfortably close to the bone.

Like the Wittgensteinian, Llewellyn

understood that an institution such as a constitution lives only insofar as it
is realized in its actual performance.' So, too, he understood that these
practices are constitutive of the people who take part in them."

Accordingly, Llewellyn denied that constitutional legitimacy is a matter of
conformity with a reified text or hypostatized Framers' intent. Rather, like
Bobbitt, he maintained that legitimacy is a function of practices: "Wherever
there are today established practices 'under' or 'in accordance with' the
Document, it is only the practice which can legitimatize the words as being
still part of our going Constitution. It is not the words which legitimatize
the practice. "I

82. BoBBrrr, FATE, supra note 6, at 228-29. Here, Bobbitt is responding to a passage in which
Llewellyn argued:
A "written constitution" is a system of unwritten practices in which the Document in
question, by virtue of men's attitudes, has a little influence. Where it makes no important
difference which way the decision goes, the Text-in the absence of countervailing
practic--is an excellent traffic-light. Aside from such cases, any Text of fifty years of
age is an Old Man of the Sea.
Llewellyn, Constitution as Institution, supra note 80, at 39 (emphasis in original). Elsewhere in
ConstitutionalFate, Bobbitt makes the related observation that Llewellyn was still a captive of the representational picture in which legal statements obtsin truth-value by correspondence with states of
affairs in the world. Bobbitt suggests that Llewellyn's work on the UCC shows that he was a constructvist "trying to create a structure, admittedly imposed, within which a statement is either correct
or incorrect." BoBBrrr, FATE, supra note 6, at 235. There is some truth to this characterization.
Llewellyn's preference for merchant practice as a basis for contractual rules, for example. can be seen
as evidence of an inclination toward empirical naturalism. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARI, LLEWE..YN
AND THE REALIST MovEMENT 224-25, 306-07 (2d ed. 1985). But it can also be understood as an
example of Llewellyn's view that-both as a descriptive and normative matter-"realism" about law
consists in legal rules that reflect social practice. See id. at 319 ("In commercial law the 'realism' that
is needed is that of a balanced and reasonably accurate picture of the whole scene in terms of patterns
of practice, of recurrent problems and of projected future trends.").
83. Thus, Llewellyn observes:
An institution is in first instance a set of ways of living and doing. It is not, infirst
instance, a matter of words or rules. The existence of an institution lies first of all and
last of all in the fact that people do behave in certain patterns a, b, and c, and do not behave in other conceivable patterns d to w.
Llewellyn, Constitution as Institution, supra note 80, at 17 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Note, however, the phrase "in first instance." Unlike the Wittgensteinian, Llewellyn does not believe
that meaning is only a matter of practice.
84. See id. at 18 ("If, like ours, it is a firmly established constitution, it involves ways of behavior
deeply set and settled in the make-up of these people-and it involves not patterns of doing (or of
inhibition) merely, but also accompanying patterns of thinking and of emotion. . .
85. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
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At this point, however, Llewellyn's thesis starts to rankle. Although
both Bobbitt and Llewellyn claim that the legitimacy of constitutional law
is a matter of "practices," they have strikingly different things in mind.
(There is no lack of irony here; notwithstanding their different views on

representation, Bobbitt and Llewellyn simply do not intend the same realworld referents.) For Bobbitt, the relevant practices are those of constitutional law as practiced by constitutional lawyers.' These are the six
modalities of constitutional argument-what he identifies as the historical,
textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential forms of argument-

that maintain the legitimacy of judicial review.' Bobbitt views these as
constituting the "grammar" of the language-game called constitutional
law. 8 He refers to them as "modalities" because they are "the ways in
which legal propositions are characterized as true from a constitutional
point of view." 89
Llewellyn, in contrast, was not interested in the forms of justificatory
argument practiced by constitutional lawyers and judges; that kind of parochialism was his principal target. Rather, Llewellyn was interested in the
Constitution as an institution in just the sense that Berger and Luckmann

explain. The practices that Llewellyn thought relevant were those of the
people who participate in the ongoing processes of government-that is, the

specialists in governance (including the officials), the interest groups that
vie to influence those specialists, and, at a remove, the general public.'

For Llewellyn, judges-and, derivatively, constitutional lawyers-are

86. See BoBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supranote 5, at 9 ("The use of the six forms of constitutional
argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture.").
87. Id. at 12-13.
88. See id. at 23 (arguing that the study of these modalities "permits the critical reader to describe
the ideological and political manipulations of the various grammars of constitutional law"); Boarrr,
FATE, supra note 6, at 6 ("There is a legal grammar that we all share and that we have all mastered
prior to our being able to ask what the reasons are for a court having power to review legislation.").
89. BoBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 12. To be precise, Bobbitt should have said

"from a constitutional lawyer's point of view." Otherwise, he might seem to be making a truth claim
about what the Constitution "really" is.
90. Thus, Llewellyn explained:
[A] working Constitution is an institution, and so consists of the ways and attitudes of
varied people; which last may be summed up more or less adequately as the going scheme
of government under which those who do it, do it; and those who get something out of
it proceed about getting something out of it; and those who take it, take it-sometimes
hard.
Llewellyn, Constitution as Institution, supra note 80, at 26. For Llewellyn, the general public serves
largely as a background constraint on the practices of the specialists. See id. at 20 ("In all but odd
cases this power of the general public operates not as a veto of action taken, but as a deterrent from
taking action-for fear of what might happen." (emphasis in original)). He described the role of the
general public as shaped both by unthinking reverence to the Constitution as a symbol and by indifference-and, therefore, de facto deference to the specialists-with respect to its contents (i.e.,
practices). See id. at 23-25.
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nothing more than a "small group of specialists" who occasionally exercise
a veto. 91
It is easy to see why Llewellyn's version of "legitimacy conferred by
practice" has such sting. Bobbitt is ensnared by the particularist fallacy.
The comparison with Llewellyn is uncomfortable because it exposes Bobbitt's view as narrow, parochial, unrealistic. For Bobbitt, law consists in
the practices of its specialists; it is first and foremost a matter of legal
conventions. Llewellyn's view, on the other hand, opens up a broader
frame of reference: "A national constitution... involves in one phase or
another the ways of a huge number of people-well-nigh the whole population."'
Llewellyn was dedicated to discrediting textualism precisely because
he saw it as narrow and unrealistic. "An inch from the eye is a portion of
the Text; the whole living world behind is 'covered' by it." 93 But
Bobbitt's parochial focus on the practice of constitutional argument has
almost exactly the same vice. It obscures an entire world of social
experience that, as I have argued both here and elsewhere, is essential to
Paradoxical as it may now
any competent understanding of the law.'
seem, one would have thought that this point should be especially congenial
to a Wittgensteinian.
To illustrate, consider Roberto Unger's critique of formalism. Unger
starts from the premise "that every branch of doctrine must rely tacitly if
not explicitly upon some picture of the forms of human association that are
right and realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals." 95 Some
such vision is necessary, he explains, if legal reasoning is to avoid degenerating into a too-easy game of ad hoc analogies and distinctions.'
He contends-credibly, in my view-that this "picture" does not take its
form from a "coherent, richly developed normative theory" because there
is none that can account for all the conflicting legal doctrines it is offered

91. Id. at 20, 22-23.
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id. at 17.
94. See supra note 63.
95. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986). Both Bobbitt and
Fish read this passage as saying that law is indeterminatewithout a transcendent normative theory. See
BOBBrrT, INTERPRETATION,supra note 5, at 164-66; FISH, supra note 15, at 379-80. In context, however, this sentence makes only the smaller claim that the coherence of every area of the law depends
on a prescriptive telos. This observation serves as the premise for a two-step argument against formalism: (1) for any given area of doctrine, there is no transcendent normative theory that can supply
that telos and still be consistent with all the cases; and (2) this failure reveals that, contrary to its formalist pretentions, law is political and ideological. UNGER, supra, at 8-11. This is not a claim either
for "Grand Theory" or "indeterminacy," but a critique of neutrality. It rests on the premise that law
is dependent on a prescriptive social vision; this dependence means that law is caught between the
Scylla and Charybdis of incoherence and ideology.
96. UNGER, supra note 95, at 8.
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to explain.' For Unger, it follows that law can only be the product of
a myriad of political and ideological conflicts.
For our purposes, Unger's premise will prove to be much more important than his conclusion. To see why, consider how a Wittgensteinian
such as Bobbitt might respond to Unger's argument. First, he would exhort us to abandon the question of justification precisely because it
precipitates this kind of all-or-nothing conclusion. Second, and relatedly,
he would deny that there are any such "pictures." He would argue that
law does not consist of representations of social life. On his view, law is
the activity of decisionmaking within the existing modalities.
The problem, of course, is that Bobbitt admits that the modalities often
will conflict and, therefore, that decision is indeterminate.9 8
He
maintains, moreover, that insisting on the exclusive claim of a particular
modality-which would ,eliminate some of this indeterminacy-turns that
modality into an ideology." In effect, then, Bobbitt concedes that law
faces the very predicament that Unger identifies: it is either ideology or
indeterminacy. Indeed, without foundations, what other alternatives could
there be? Bobbitt believes that he has solved this problem with the resortto-conscience gambit. But, as we have seen, this is like pasting a rhetorical Band-Aid over a very real aporia.
We have both reason to refuse this invitation to re-enter the infinite
regress and the means to do so. The way is already suggested by our earlier discussion of the defects of practice fetishism.1" Thus, we could
accept the Wittgensteinian's first response without buying into the second;
we could abandon the notion of justification without relinquishing entirely
the concept of representation.
In that event, our reaction to Unger's challenge would change. We
would no longer seek a "coherent, richly developed normative theory-"10
to justify a branch of doctrine and, accordingly, would not be disappointed
when we could not find one. But it would remain true that we need something to keep the doctrine from lapsing into the endless play of analogies
and distinctions. Bobbitt candidly concedes that the conventions cannot
fulfill this role because the modalities themselves are not determinate. So
what serves this function?
Surprisingly, the Wittgensteinian's answer is not very different from
Unger's; to say that meaning inheres in a practice is, as we have seen, to
say that meaning is given by a "vision" or set of understandings about
goals, methods, values, and underlying rationales that constitute that prac97. Id. at 9.
98. See text accompanying notes 9-10.
99. BoBBIrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 24-25, 164.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
101. UNGER, supra note 95, at 9.
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tice as a practice. As Stanley Fish explains with respect to literary
interpretation, "the rule-of-thumb reader begins with a knowledge of the
outcome he desires, and it is within such knowledge that the rule assumes
a shape, becomes readable." 1" Thus, all that really changes on the Witt-

gensteinian account is that, having eschewed justification, we are left with
a purely causal question."
So where does this "picture" of social relations come from? Necessarily, it arises from the social practices and

conditions that already exist in the relevant culture. The answer to the
question "What warrants the law?" is "A prior picture of social relations."
At the same time, the answer to the question "Where does that picture
come from?" is "From those very social relations."
The alternative, in short, is to recognize the reflexive relation between
practice and meaning. This is the view taken by Charles Taylor, for example."' This alternative is, of course, conceivable only if one recog-

nizes the possibility of objectification, institutionalization, and retention of
legal meaning. But it has the distinct advantage of avoiding the infinite
regress while neither treating practice reductively nor claiming any ob-

jective or privileged status for those practices.

5

A principal point of Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game is to
emphasize that a language or rhetorical system like law is always "part of

an activity, or of a form of life."" 6 Bobbitt reads this claim narrowly
to apply to the particular activity of constitutional argument. But, as
Bobbitt himself recognizes, constitutional law is not an abstract forensic
exercise; it also must connect with our day-to-day affairs." ° It follows
that a practice like constitutional law cannot be understood apart from the

larger social practices-the form of life-in which it participates. Thus,
Bobbitt concedes that "[t]he concepts which occur in Constitutional law
must also occur and have a meaning in everyday life ....

It is the use of

102. FISH, supra note 15, at 317; see also id. at 295 ("Words are intelligible only within the assumption of some context of intentional production, some already-in-place predecision as to what kind
of person, with what kind of purposes, in relation to what specific goals in a particular situation, is
speaking or writing." (emphasis omitted)).
103. See RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 16, at 15 (explaining that the "Wittgensteinian
attitude" makes "all questions about the relation of [mind and language] to the rest of [the] universe
causal questions, as opposed to questions about adequacy of representation or expression" (emphasis
in original)).
104. See CHARLESTAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY204
(1989) ("The basic relation is that ideas articulate practices.... That is, the ideas frequently arise
from attempts to formulate and bring to some conscious expression the underlying rationale of...
[existing patterns of behavior].").
105. See Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE I.L. & HUMAN. 233,
235 (1994) [hereinafter Winter, Human Values] (arguing that social contingency should be viewed as
"foundational" in this nonobjectivist sense).
106. WrrrENSTEIN, supra note 26, § 23; see supra note 26.
107. See BoBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 40.
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these concepts outside law... that makes their use within constitutional
law meaningful."108 He even acknowledges that there is some reflexivity
in the relation between law and culture. 9 He insists nevertheless that
law is both separate and primary."' As he puts it, "[t]he rules of constitutional law are not derived from these everyday uses, however, but
result from the operations of the various conventions."'
Bobbitt's version of the relation between law and culture is one that
firmly places law and lawyers at the center of the social universe. It is a
kind of legal ethnocentrism, and it is indefensible as a theoretical or
empirical matter. As Robert Cover points out, "[p]recepts must 'have
meaning,' but they necessarily borrow it from materials created by social
activity."112 So, too, Llewellyn at his best recognized the degree to
which law is dependent on culture: "As to tools, law has borrowed copiously from the rest of culture: language, logic, writing; and for the
subject matter of its thinking it borrows the whole stock of practices,
standards, ethics that make up the social, economic and religious phases of
society."1'

108. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6, at 237.
109. Id. at 184 ("[T]here is a reflexiveness, a kinaesthetic, mutually affecting reaction between
a society and its law.").
110. Id. at 185 ("Because I do not believe we are born with a taste for jury trials or the Australian
ballot, I must assume that our institutions play some role in establishing our aesthetic principles in these
matters. The Constitution is first among such institutions."). The logic of this inference is something
less than inescapable; there are some intermediate possibilities betweenthe alternatives of innate instinct
and the primacy of formal legal institutions. For example, Arthur Leff argues quite credibly that our
trial practices mirror our characteristic cultural values. See Arthur A. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J.
989, 1003-05 (1978).
111. BOBBrrr, FATE, supra note 6, at 237 (empbasis in original).
112. Cover, supra note 53, at 18.
113. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 1, at 117. Llewellyn's famous, but little understood concept of situation-sense is best comprehended in this way. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN. THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 261 (1960) (describing how one exercises situationsense by "visualizing the hands-and-feet operations in the picture, seen as a going scheme, a working
setup"); see also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
NarrativeMeaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225,2263-64 (1989) (noting the experiential and image-based
nature of this description and concluding that "Llewellyn's notion of situation-sense incorporates virtually all of the essential attributes of the idealized cognitive model identified by experientialist theory;
it lacks only an account of internal configuration").
Llewellyn, however, was not always consistent in maintaining this insight; he was, perhaps,
sometimes too exuberant to extol the virtues of craft. In Bramble Bush, for example, Llewellyn indicated that he was "strongly inclined to believe that one of the earliest and most persistent stimuli to
the growth of generalization, classification, and so of rational thought ... is attributable more to law
than to any other phase of civilization except perhaps language." LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra
note 1, at 118. The false bravado of this claim, which mistakes cause and effect, is revealed by the
final proviso: The human capacity to generalize is the indispensible prerequisite for having a linguistic
capacity. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987). Law is just one social by-product. Thus, earlier in
Bramble Bush, Llewellyn observed that the concept of precedent is the legal correllate of habit and social institutions. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 1, at 70; see infra note 126.

1994]

The Constitution of Conscience

1831

Let me sketch two examples that I have developed at greater length
elsewhere." 4 It is easy enough to imagine the historical, textual,
structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential arguments in support of the
constitutional right to travel. Not surprisingly, it is "fundamental,"
"firmly established and repeatedly recognized."11
Still, the Supreme

Court has been remarkably casual about the nature of this right-noting,
for example, that "[w]e have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right
to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision."16 It may be

that the legitimacy of the constitutional right to travel is maintained by the
availability of the modal arguments that the Court neglects to make. But
it seems at least equally likely-and more consistent with the (absent)

forensic evidence-that the legitimacy of the right to travel arises from the
fact that it's deeply implicated in the cultural and historical life of a nation
forged in the experience of immigration and westward expansion-not to
mention one so currently dominated by the automobile. What could be

more quintessentially American?
If the right to travel reveals the relevance of the living world behind
the modalities of argument, the First Amendment demonstrates how that

world penetrates the modalities themselves. 1 ' The familiar "marketplace
of ideas" metaphor that so invigorates our modem thinking about free
speech is itself contingent on social practices entirely unrelated to freedom
of expression. Thus, Milton's seventeenth-century polemic against censorship, the Areopagitica,used the "market" metaphor to deride the notion

of licensed printing."n Milton, of course, wrote in an era of imperial
mercantilism. It is only after the rise of laissezfaire capitalism that the
"marketplace of ideas" even makes sense as a metaphor for the First

Amendment ideal of open debate. If, today, we can trace a doctrinal line
that runs from Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States 9 to

Brennan's opinion inNew York Times v. Sullivan,"2 we can do so in part
114. What follows is a condensation of a more detailed argument that is elaborated in Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability, supra note 63, at 1485-92, 1511-13.
115. United States v. Guest, 383 U.5. 745, 757 (1966).
116. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
117. Here, I am recapitulating part of an argument elaborated previously in Winter,
TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 47, at 1183-95, 1224-32. For a more complete summary, see
Winter, FastFoodandFalseFriendsin the Shopping Mall ofIdeas, 64 U. COLO.L. REv. 965 (1993).
118. See John Milton, Areopagitica:A Speech ofMr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicenc'd
Printing, To the ParliamentofEngland, in THE PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 265, 303-04 (J. Max Patrick
ed., 1968) ("Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopoliz'd and traded in by tickets
and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all knowledge in the
Land, to mark and license it like our broad cloath, and our wooll packs." (citations omitted)).
119. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.").
120. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (invoking the "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
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because of entirely unrelated social changes with respect to our economic
practices and institutions.
If Bobbitt overlooks these more complex relations between culture and
law, there is still much that is valuable in his approach. It seems clear to

me that he is right in saying that the validity of judicial review is not a
matter of some transcendent justification; its legitimacy is given by our
practices."' So, too, his taxonomy of the forms of constitutional argument is exceedingly useful for sorting out the issues and debates in conventional constitutional life. Bobbitt goes astray only when he tries to

claim more for the forms of argument than they can plausibly bear on their
own.

Bobbitt stumbles because he wants to maintain that his taxonomy is
more than a taxonomy, that there is something special-even holy"about the forms of argument that he has identified. But is it really plausible to say that historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and

prudential arguments are the unique province or invention of law? Arguments premised on intent ("What did she mean when she said that... ?"),
text ("But that isn't what you said!"), institutional function or design ("Just
let me do my job."), and instrumentalism ("It's not the way we were
taught at school, but it gets the job done.") are all familiar aspects of
everyday life."z Ethical argument, in Bobbitt's distinctive definition, is

explicitly rooted in a wider cultural ethos."

Only doctrinal argument

would seem to have any claim to professional distinctiveness. Yet, even
here, one finds ample evidence to the contrary. One need only recall

Medea's contract-based arguments" s or Llewellyn's description of the or-

121. But,'then, Alexander Bickel, Robert Dahli, Jan Deustch, Karl Llewellyn, Laurence Tribe,
and-no doubt-others all agree. See Winter, An UpsidelDown View, supra note 63, at 1924 n.220
(collecting sources).
122. Bobbitt closes his book with the piety: "Decision according to law is an ideal, but it is also
an art and finally it is our piety, our 'service to God.'" BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at
186. Consider, too, his heavy-handed rebuke to critical legal studies, which is so reminiscent of
Carrington's tirade:
It is not enough, therefore, for the critic to describe a possible world in which there
is less injustice than in the present. He must also show that it is possible to actualize such
a world in which the system of interpretation is legitimate or acknowledge that he is
simply proposing the destruction of our fundamental civil institution.
Id. at 170; cf. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984)
("[Tihere is dread in disbelief. A lawyer who succumbs to legal nihilism... must contemplate the
dreadful reality of government by cunning and a society in which the only right is might.").
123. See Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REv. 915, 928-34 (1988) (using a quite ordinary argument between a child and her babysitter to demonstrate the common forms of legal
argument); see also RICHARD A. PoSNsR, THs PROBLEmS OF JUJiSPRUDENCE 71-100 (1990) (arguing
that there is little distinction between legal reasoning and practical ressoning generally).
124. BoBBrrr, INTERP-RETATION, supra note 5, at 20 ("This form of argument denotes an appeal
to those elements of the American cultural ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.").
125. See supra note 40.
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dinary social roots of the doctrine of precedent"~ to see that law differs
surprisingly little either in content or form.
Llewellyn recommended that we make of law an anthropology."z
The advice is cogent beyond the obvious sense of recommending systematic
inquiry into the institutional and social practices that constitute the law.
Culture, as we have seen, is both anterior and interior to the language and
thought of law. Approaches to law that proceed on the assumption of its
separability from or superiority to life are little more than a form of
professional self-flattery.
IV. Forms of Justice? Forms of Life
Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of Bobbitt's approach is the way
in which he deploys "conscience" as the mystery ingredient that vindicates
the system: "I conclude that the system is just, not because it produces just
outcomes, but because it permits an opportunity for justice consistent with
the freedom of the conscience to decide matters. "" As to the makeup
of this conscience we are told little, except the cryptic line that "there is
no conscience without faith for without faith there is only expediency."129
If this suggestion works at all, it is only because it is reassuring in
tone and familiar in content. Like a contemporary Chauncey Gardiner,"3
Bobbitt effectively invokes the soothing metaphor of the garden: "The
space for moral reflection on our ideologies is created by the conflict
among the modalities, just as garden walls can create a space for a garden."131 But, as even his most ardent admirer points out, this metaphor
is as weak as the point it is offered to illustrate: "The problem with the
metaphor of the garden ... is that without a public practice of gardening,

126. As Llewellyn explains:
The foundation, then, of precedent is the official analogue of what, in society at large, we
know as folkways, or as institutions, and of what, in the individual, we know as habit.... It takes time and effort to solve problems.... Both inertia and convenience
speak for building further on what you have already built; for incorporating the decision
once made, the solution once worked out, into your operating technique without
reexaminationof what earlier went into reaching your solution.
LLEwELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 1, at 64-65 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 144-45.
128. BoBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 163.
129. Id. at xvii. The sentiment is also unpersuasive, for it appears to ignore commitment or, more
precisely, committed action. See Cover, supra note 53, at 45 ("The transformation of interpretation
into legal meaning begins when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and, through the personal act of commitment, affirms the position taken." (footnote omitted)); see also W'mter, Human
Values, supra note 105, at 248 ("[T]he problem of values is one of learning to rediscover their locus
in our practices and commitments. There is no other basis for our values than our own committed
actions.").
130. See JERZY KosiNsKI, BEING THERE (1970).
131. BoBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 177.
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it is impossible to tell whether someone is gardening or merely moving
plants around."132 Indeed, without a shared social practice of gardening,
it is not even possible to tell whether they are garden walls and not, say,
the walls of a prison-or a dead-end.
Bobbitt's resort to conscience is, as has been noted, decidedly un-Wittgensteinian.13 Nowhere in his account is there a practice or languagegame of conscience. The most likely candidate, the practice of moral evaluation, is said to be something separate and later."
Bobbitt presents
conscience as elemental, inexplicable, and individualistic: "The United
States Constitution formalizes a role for the conscience of the individual
sensibility by requiring decisions that rely on the individual moral sensibility when the modalities of argument clash."135 For Bobbitt, then, it
is as if conscience were some "private language." 3 6
This is not a mere lapse of consistency in an "otherwise compelling
account," 37 but a consequence of a fundamental flaw in Bobbitt's argument. His particularist view of practice restricts his gaze to the narrow
horizon constituted by the argumentative practices of constitutional lawyers
and judges. The entire world of social activity that lies beyond is obscured, ignored, and forgotten. This omission is fatal. Lawyers argue;
judges decide; people act and are acted upon. Bobbitt sees only the first
two moments. For him, law is reduced to an empty space of argumentative practices and inexplicable decisions based on individual conscience.
The archetype here is less the naturalized behaviorism of a Wittgenstein
than the transcendental idealism of a Kant. Thus, Bobbitt's single most
revealing statement is that "values come into being" through "the exercise
of moral choice."13 Entirely absent from his analysis is any conception
of social action.139

132. Patterson, Conscience and Constitution, supra note 33, at 302 n.100.
133. Id. at 303-04.
134. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
135. BoBIrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 168.
136. C. Patterson, Conscience and Constitution, supra note 33, at 303 ("The philosophical inspiration for Bobbitt's position, Wittgenstein, himself inveighed against the possibility of a private language.").
137. Id. at 306.
138. BoIrrT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 179.
139. In contrast, John Dewey maintained that "moral judgment and moral responsibility are the
work wrought in us by the social environment." DEWEY, supra note 19, at 316. Accordingly, he argued that the failure to attend to the social dimension of conscience is morally retrogressive:
Of what avail is it to prech unassuming simplicity and contentment of life when communal admiration goes to the man who "succeeds"-who makes himself conspicuous and
envied because of command of money and other forms of power?. . The notion that
an abstract ready-msde conscience exists in individuals and that it is only necessary to
make an occasional appeal to it... is'
associated with the causes of the lack of definitive
and orderly moral advance. For it is associated with lack of attention to social forces.
Id. at 319.
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Worse yet, this analysis conduces to a strangely abstract conception
of justice. As Cover points out, judicial interpretations "are not only
'practical,' they are, themselves, practices" precisely because the "judicial
word is a mandate for the deeds of others."" ° Following Cover, Bobbitt

remarks: "Cases do not arise because the litigants want to test what a particular judge thinks the Constitution is for. Litigants want justice."14
Just so. But the only justice that Bobbitt has to offer is a purely formal
justice. 42 Like its cousin "formal equality," this formal justice is rendered via the key words "opportunity," "freedom," and "individual." 43

And like its cousin, it is rendered in empty promises.
Conscience, like the law, is constituted in the forms of life that give
Thus, in an earlier
meaning to our categories, concepts, and values."
encounter with Bobbitt, I argued both that the practice of a truly "constitu-

tional" politics must struggle with the much more difficult task of making
constitutional meaning and that this task requires social action. 4 Fortunately, that quite lengthy argument can be summed up by a simple "syllogism":
(1) The justice we can achieve is constrained by the forms of

life in which we find ourselves.
(2) It follows, therefore, that the justice we can imagine is

attained only in the construction of new forms of life.
(3) If we think otherwise, we are just fooling ourselves.

140. RobertM. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALELJ. 1601, 1611 (1986). Cover explains:
"[1It is precisely this embedding of an understanding of political text in institutional modes of action
that distinguishes legal interpretation.. . . Legal interpretation is either played out on the field of pain
and death or it is something less (or more) than law." Id. at 1606-07 (emphasis in original).
141. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 40.
142. See id. at 168 ("The United States Constitutionformalizesa role for the conscience of the
individual sensibility ..... (emphasis added)).
143. See id. at 163 ("[Tlhe system is just, not because it produces just outcomes, but because it
permits an opportunity for justice consistent with the freedom of the conscience to decide .....
(emphasis added)); id. at 168 ("The United States Constitution formalizes a role for the conscience of
the individualsensibility .... ." (emphasis added)).
144. See DEWEY, supra note 19, at 323 ("[T]he formation of habits of belief, desire and judgment
is going on at every instant under the influence of the conditions set by men's contact, intercourse and
associations with one another."). For a detailed example, see Winter, An Upside/Down View, supra
note 63, at 1905-25 (discussing the Court's culturally-based myopia in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)).
145. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability, supra note 63, at 1473-1505.

